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When vaccines are limited, prior research has suggested it is most protective to distribute vaccines to the most
central individuals – those who are most likely to spread the disease. But surveying the population’s social
network is a costly and time-consuming endeavour, often not completed before vaccination must begin. This
paper validates a local targeting method for distributing vaccines. That is, ask randomly chosen individuals to
nominate for vaccination the person they are in contact with who has the most disease-spreading contacts. Even
better, ask that person to nominate the next person for vaccination, and so on. To validate this approach, we
simulate the spread of COVID-19 along empirical contact networks collected in two high schools, in the United
States and France, pre-COVID. These weighted networks are built by recording whenever students are in close
spatial proximity and facing one another. We show here that nomination of most popular contacts performs
significantly better than random vaccination, and on par with strategies which assume a full survey of the
population. These results are robust over a range of realistic disease-spread parameters, as well as a larger
synthetic contact network of 3000 individuals.

1. Introduction
Although viable vaccines for COVID-19 are now widely in use,
accessibility to the vaccine is progressing slowly through the world. As
of this writing (April 20, 2021), 40% of the U.S. population have
received at least one dose of the vaccine, almost 50% of the U.K. and
62% of Israelis. However, only 6.5% of the world’s population has had at
least one dose and less than 1% in Africa. In light of this stark reality, and
in response to the possible need for distributing new vaccines to fight
new strains of this virus or others, we should find ways to improve the
effectiveness of the limited vaccines a community, school, or nation has
available (Figs. 1–4).
The current dominant method for vaccine prioritisation is to first
vaccinate those most vulnerable, then front-line workers most likely to
be exposed to the disease, working eventually towards herd immunity at
around 70% of the population vaccinated. This overall strategy for tar
geting has been recently shown through simulation to be optimal in
avoiding hospitalization and death (Jahn et al., 2021). To reduce total
infections and deaths we can employ a more nuanced targeting strategy
which aims at those who are most likely to spread the disease. This

methodology does not necessarily supplant the prioritisation just
mentioned but may be used to complement it. For example, within a
nursing home, local nomination strategies could be used to choose who
to vaccinate first and may yield important transmitters as opposed to an
age or comorbidity approach. In addition, after these highest risk groups
are vaccinated a targeted approach could be used to vaccinate the
population at large.
Prior work has shown that individuals most central in the diseasespread network are the most important targets for vaccines (Dezső &
Barabási, 2002; Jia et al., 2020; Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2002),
and even in the specific context of COVID-19 (Jadidi et al., 2020).
Nunner et al. (2022) recently demonstrated that targeting occupational
categories as a proxy for connectedness in a contact network is quite
effective. Some work has pointed to the importance of decentralised
methods for nominating those who should be vaccinated (Cohen et al.,
2003; Hébert-Dufresne et al., 2013; Holme, 2004; Ke & Yi, 2006; Lee
et al., 2012; Taghavian et al., 2017). One compelling method chooses a
random individual and nominates for vaccination a random of their
contacts. This “random nomination strategy” relies on the Friendship
Paradox, the fact that these random contacts will be more connected

* Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: am2873@cornell.edu (A.M. McGail), sfeld@purdue.edu (S.L. Feld).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pmedr.2022.101787
Received 9 March 2022; Received in revised form 22 March 2022; Accepted 2 April 2022
Available online 5 April 2022
2211-3355/© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

A.M. McGail et al.

Preventive Medicine Reports 27 (2022) 101787

than random individuals are (Feld, 1991). This strategy has been shown
to be more effective than random vaccination (Wang et al., 2016; Manzo
& van de Rijt, 2020 for COVID in particular). A related strategy asks
individuals to recall who they interacted with most recently, relying on
the recurring nature of interactions. Lee et al. (2012) have shown that
this method outperforms random nomination.
In this paper we suggest the nomination of most popular contacts (NP)
as a practical and effective method. In this method administrators
choose an individual at random and ask them to nominate a contact of
theirs who has disease-spreading contact with the most people.
Although similar strategies have been proposed and evaluated in the
physics literature (Holme, 2004; Ke & Yi, 2006; Wang et al., 2016), they
have been ignored by epidemiologists and policymakers. One possible
reason, which leads to the central contribution of this paper, is that the
models they use, and the networks on which they evaluate these stra
tegies, are simplifications at best. Holme (2004) finds that chained
nomination of most popular contacts, NP(c) in this paper, is the most
effective local targeting strategy of those he analysed, but he does not
test this using realistic contact networks, nor perturbing the model of
disease spread or (of course) calibrating this model to COVID-19 in
particular.
This paper evaluates the strategy using more realistic simulations,
which simulate the spread of COVID-19 on contact networks measured

from physical interactions in a real-world setting, and presents results in
a digestible form, in the hopes of spurring renewed policy interest in
decentralised targeting strategies for vaccines. Our analyses show a
marked robustness of the effectiveness of nomination of most popular
contacts over a wide range of disease spread models over three contact
networks, and with some loosening of the assumption that individuals
can accurately nominate their most contacted contact. The DATA and
METHODS sections describe the contact networks, targeting strategies,
and simulation methodologies. We conclude with Fig. 6 and Fig. 7,
which detail the relative effectiveness of the vaccine strategies across
combinations of network and model of disease spread.
2. Data
2.1. Empirical contact networks
Epidemiological models often assume homogeneous mixing, where
an infected individual has equal probability of infecting anyone else in
the population. And when epidemiologists employ a networked
approach, they often use an unweighted network, where contact either
exists or does not between each pair of interactants, with no variation.
Both these assumptions are patently false (Bioglio et al., 2016), and
variation in contact proves instrumental to accurate modelling of

Fig. 1. HS-1. Contact network between students in a French lycee, one Tuesday in 2013. Nodes are coloured by their grade level.
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disease spread (Manzo & van de Rijt, 2020; Stehlé et al., 2011). In this
paper we include the more practical and differentiated structure of the
contact network of two high schools as they operated pre-COVID. We
focus on high-school students as they are the most likely to not follow
public health or other authority recommendations around social
distancing and mask wearing. Furthermore, in the United States the rate
of infection is twice as high in those aged 12–17 compared to 5–11-yearolds (Leeb et al., 2020).
In these two studies (HS-1, Mastrandrea et al., 2015, and HS-2, Sal
athé et al., 2010), students wore battery-powered Bluetooth transmitters
/ receivers which exchange packets of information whenever students
are in close physical proximity with each other. The signals do not travel
as far through solid objects, including students’ bodies. They most
reliably communicate when students are face-to-face and within a dis
tance of approximately 6 feet (in HS-1) and approximately 3 feet (in HS2). The sensors have been designed to reliably determine colocation in
each 20s interval, resulting in an extremely high-resolution contact
network. These temporal contact networks have been extensively and
independently evaluated for the purpose of studying respiratory diseases

whose main vector of transmission is across such short distances. As such
they are an ideal source for plausible simulations of the spread of
COVID-19.
The physical and social structures of these two schools yield social
networks that are similar in some ways, and different in others. The
French lycée (HS-1) is split into three grades, each of which are split into
three classes. Students mostly interact within their own class, but in the
hallways, during lunch, and before and after school, we see many more
cross-class contacts, especially within grade. Some students act as a
bridge between classes and there is strong age homophily. The American
high school (HS-2) has many of the same characteristics, but split across
four grade levels, and with much more between-class interactions. HS-2
is also more than double the size. These structural elements, amongst
others which I have not noted, are embedded as features of the HS-1 and
HS-2 networks upon which we simulate the spread of COVID-19 in this
paper. In all, the differences between these two schools and the two
sensor methodologies offer strong robustness checks to the results we
present.

Fig. 2. HS-2. The contact network between 656 students, 56 staff, 73 teachers, and 5 others in a U.S. high school, one Thursday in 2010. Nodes with a black border
are non-students, and are essentially disconnected from the student contact network.
3

A.M. McGail et al.

Preventive Medicine Reports 27 (2022) 101787

Fig. 3. Synthetic contact network of 3000 individuals, clustered within age-groups and riveted together into family units.
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at all, which in turn depends on institutional, logistic, and individual
psychological factors. Individuals differ in how COVID-19 affects them
and their subsequent infectiousness, and the scope of this variability and
its relationship with network position are not entirely known. In
response to the existing knowledge and extant uncertainty of how
COVID-19 spreads, we test a range of modifications to the central
nomination strategy, in addition to perturbing average infectiousness,
the variation in infectiousness across the population, the percent
vaccinated, the number of initial infections, all in addition to testing in
the context of the three contact networks described above. The following
subsections detail the vaccine targeting strategies and simulation
methodology we consider.

Fig. 4. Illustration of disease spread model used in this paper. Exposure (E) is
predicated on contact with an infected (I) individual. Transitions E → I and I →
R are drawn from exponential distributions.

2.2. Synthetic network of a town
The third contact network we use in this paper represents a small
town of 3000 residents and was generated procedurally using SEIRS+
(McGee et al., 2021). The algorithm (an adaptation of FARZ) reproduces
the clustering and degree distribution observed on average in the United
States. This network also reproduces the age distribution of United
States citizens, and the differential probability of contact between those
of different age groups. Within each of the four age groups a community
structure is generated, representing primary schools, secondary schools,
workplaces, and elderly community structures. Average degree by age
group was matched to an empirical measurement of contact networks in
the United States (Mossong et al., 2008). Individuals from different age
groups are then grouped into households, matching the distribution of
household sizes and the household age demographics of the United
States.

3.1. Vaccine targeting strategies
R – Random Each person is equally likely to be vaccinated.
D – Degree – First determine the number of contacts each person has
(their so-called degree). Choose the N people who have the highest
degree.
NR – Random nomination – 1) Choose a person at random. 2) From
their unvaccinated contacts choose a person to be vaccinated at random.
3) Repeat steps 1 and 2 until N individuals are vaccinated. As shown by
Feld (1991), randomly nominated individuals are on average more
central than random individuals (R), and this method is a common
benchmark for decentralized strategies.
NP – Nomination of most Popular contacts – Same as Random
Nomination (NR), except people nominate their unvaccinated contact
who is in contact with the most other people.
NP(ε) – Nomination of most Popular contacts with Gaussian
error – Same as Nomination of most Popular contacts (NP), except in
dividuals will estimate their contacts’ number of contacts with error
which is normally distributed with standard deviation ε.
NP(N) – Nomination amongst top N most Popular contacts –
Same as Nomination of most Popular contacts (NP), except individuals will
nominate randomly from their top N highest degree unvaccinated
contacts.
(c) – Chained nomination – Each nomination strategy listed above
has an accompanying “chained” version. Instead of fetching a new
random person for each new nomination, we have the most recently
vaccinated person make the nomination. Whenever they cannot (all

3. Methods
The contact network and a realistic model of disease spread together
constitute a complete understanding of the spread of a disease. But both
are heterogeneous across local contexts, and to some extent unmeasur
able. How exactly COVID-19 spreads depends on many factors, and our
understanding of these factors is still incomplete. For example, the
probability that an infected individual spreads the disease to another
person in one day is very hard to measure and depends on a variety of
factors. Masking, ventilation, the physical arrangement of a space, these
all contribute to reducing the probability of contagion. These pro
pensities are also affected by individual attributes such as age, and a
social context’s relation to the outside environment. Different vaccina
tion strategies have differential relative effectiveness depending on the
number of vaccines administered, and who is available for vaccination

Fig. 5. The average number of exposures over the course of 100 days in HS-2, with E[R0] = 2.5 and initially infecting 20 individuals. The gray strip around each
trend represents the 95% confidence interval, ±1.96*√s̅̅̅
where s is the sample standard deviation and N is the number of simulations, 500.
N
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Fig. 6. Effectiveness by infectiousness. This figure presents the effectiveness of degree-based nomination (D), variations of popularity-based nomination (NP), and
random nomination (NR), with different average infectiousness (R0_mean). In all scenarios we assume 20% of the population is vaccinated, and 20 individuals are
infected at the start. The measure reported on the x-axis is what proportion of the susceptible population is infected, relative to random vaccination (R).

their friends have been vaccinated), or at the beginning when no people
have been vaccinated, we start a new chain with a random person.
For example, NP(c), chained nomination of most popular contacts be
gins by choosing a person to be vaccinated at random. They then choose
their unvaccinated contact who has the most contacts to be vaccinated
second. This person then nominates a third, and so on, until the most
recently vaccinated person can no longer nominate a person. The pro
cess then begins again from a randomly chosen unvaccinated person,
continuing until we have run out of vaccines or people.

states and the recovery time are also drawn from exponential distribu
tions, with expected means which are somewhat different for each
person. In the case of the synthetic network, these parameters are tuned
to match what we know of their age-dependence in the case of COVID19. For full details on the distributions we used for these parameters, see
the online supplement.
The daily probability of spread for COVID-19 has been measured to
be anywhere from less than 0.05 to 0.2 on average for those who come
into contact in that day (Carcione et al., 2020; Jiang et al., 2020; Mwalili
et al., 2020), corresponding to a wide range of R0 anywhere from near
1.0 to upwards of 5. This does not only reflect an uncertainty of the
“true” transmissibility of COVID. Instead it reflects the heterogeneity of
this average transmissibility across different contexts. A typical estimate
in the literature is 2.5 (e.g. as used in Manzo and van der Rijt), but in this
paper we vary R0 along this entire range, assessing to what extent dif
ferences in average transmissibility may change the overall results. We
generate R0 for each individual based on a gamma distribution. For the
central models in this paper we assume a relatively low coefficient of
variation CV[R0] = 0.2, which describes the variation in personal R0
across the population, although the supplement checks robustness with
respect to this parameter. Note also that we assume that those aged 0–19
are half as susceptible to infection as those aged 20 +.
To begin the simulation, according to one of the targeting methods

3.2. Simulation methodology
We use a stochastic SEIR (susceptible, exposed, infected, removed)
model for disease spread, following the model contributed and compiled
by McGee et al. (2021). In this model, a susceptible person is exposed (E)
to COVID-19 by one of their infected (I) contacts. The exposure occurs at
a randomly chosen time, drawn from an exponential distribution with
mean depending on the infectiousness of the infected person, the sus
ceptibility of the exposed person, and the amount of in-person contact
they share. Once exposed, an individual will after some time move into
the infected (I) state where they can expose others, and some time later
will move into the recovered (R) state, no longer infectious or suscep
tible to infection. The latent period between the exposed and infected
6
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Fig. 7. Effectiveness by proportion vaccinated. This figure presents the effectiveness of degree-based nomination (D), variations of popularity-based nomination
(NP), and random nomination (NR), with different proportions of the population vaccinated. In all scenarios we assume 20% of the population is vaccinated, and 20
individuals are infected at the start. The measure reported on the x-axis is what proportion of the susceptible population is infected, relative to random vaccina
tion (R).

detailed in the previous section, we assume that some group of in
dividuals had been vaccinated at the start of the simulation, and are not
at all susceptible to the infection. They are fully removed from the
disease-spread network. Then we randomly infect some number of un
vaccinated individuals. We then run the simulation for 100 days. The
measure we use for the effectiveness of any given strategy is the total
number of individuals who entered the exposed (E) state at any time in
the 100 days. For each set of parameter values, we run 500 independent
simulations, choosing again who to vaccinate and who to infect, in order
to estimate accurately the properties of the distribution of total in
fections under these scenarios. We report uncertainty in our estimate of
the true mean infected by the standard error. For uncertainty in the
percent improvement over not vaccinating or random vaccination, we
bootstrap from the sampled simulation results. We collect 10,000 sam
ples with replacement, with sample size 500, and calculate the quantiles
of the relevant ratios corresponding to a 95% CI.
Because HS-1 and HS-2 are empirically gathered contact datasets, we
assume that the measured contact is the only contact on which disease
may spread. However, the synthetic network generates strong contact
ties according to what we know of institutional and family ties. This
would leave out spread which occurs in public and interstitial spaces.
And so for the synthetic network alone we assume a propensity of

random spread to any other node in the network, in addition to the
propensity of spread along network ties. This is constant throughout, set
at 20% of an individual’s total disease-spread contact.

E

[R0]

CV
[R0]
S
SV
Net
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Parameter Name

Tested
Values

Description

Average individuals’
infectiousness

1, 2.5, 4

Coefficient of
variation of
individuals’
infectiousness
Starting Infections

0.2, 0.8,
1.4, 2.0, 2.5

The expected number of
additional infections in a
completely connected
population, given a seed
infection.
Parametrizes the influence of
individual super-spreaders in
the dynamics of the infection.

Percent vaccinated at
the start of the
simulation
Network on which
disease spreads.

5%, 10%,
20%

5, 10, 20

HS-1, HS-2,
Synthetic

Number of infections at the
start of the simulation.
Percent of the population
vaccinated on the first day of
the simulation.
These networks are described
in Data.
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4. Results

network position. With dramatic increase in this variability, there was
not an appreciable increase in effectiveness of the targeting strategies
relative to random vaccination (Fig. S7).
For a deeper look at all the realised runs of the simulation we use in
this paper as well as the remainder of these robustness checks, or to
extend these results to new empirical settings or differently specified
models of disease spread or vaccination nomination, see the accompa
nying repository at https://www.github.com/amcgail/episim/. We also
verified in this repository that the ordering of daily contact in HS-1 and
HS-2 were irrelevant for the outcomes reported here through explicitly
simulating these dynamics.

First we present the relative effectiveness of these vaccination stra
tegies under one scenario. That is, with the average infectiousness R0 =
2.5 (with coefficient of variation = 0.2), and initially infecting 20 in
dividuals. The average numbers of individuals infected in each context
when we do not vaccinate at all, across 500 simulations, are 28.0 ± 0.6
of the 290 remaining susceptible in HS-1 (9.7%), 149.8 ± 3.3 of the 764
remaining susceptible in HS-2 (19.6%), and 267.6 ± 10.6 of the 2980
remaining susceptible in the synthetic network (9.0%). More than 25%
of the population is infected in 0.2% (HS-1), 29.4% (HS-2), and 2.0%
(the synthetic network) of simulations. Vaccinating 20% of the popu
lation randomly will decrease the average number of infections after
100 days by 22.8% (HS-1; 18.3% – 26.9%), 52.9% (HS-2; 49.5% –
55.7%), and 62.3% (the synthetic network; 57.4% – 66.4%). And
crucially for the purposes of this paper, nomination of most popular
contacts (NP) does significantly better than random vaccination.
Vaccinating 20% of the population in this way decreases the average
number of infections after 100 days by a further 17.1% (HS-1; 12.1% –
22.0%), 17.3% (HS-2; 11.2% – 22.7%), and 59.5% (the synthetic
network; 54.3% – 63.6%), relative to random vaccination. In paren
theses are listed 95% confidence intervals as described in the Methods
section. Fig. 5 shows this central comparison as it evolves over the 100
days.
This relative effectiveness will be our metric throughout the rest of
this section. That is, what is the improvement of the vaccination strategy
over randomly vaccinating individuals. We bring forward two robust
ness checks to the relative effectiveness of the vaccination strategies,
that of modifying E[R0] (the average infectiousness in the population),
and the proportion of individuals who are vaccinated. The relative
effectiveness of strategies for E[R0] = [1, 2.5, 4] are presented in Fig. 6,
and for SV = [5%, 10%, 20%] in Fig. 7. When E[R0] is higher the dif
ference between randomly vaccinating and nominating most popular
contacts increases, especially in the synthetic network. Indeed, the most
extreme benefit of NP is observed for the synthetic network with E[R0]
= 4. This is also the circumstance with the highest average number of
infected individuals overall. In this case approximately 75% additional
susceptible individuals are saved from infection on average by incor
porating NP over random vaccination.
For HS-2 the incorporation of error in nomination through the NP(N)
and NP(ε) does not have any detectable effect across these simulations,
whereas error does moderate the effectiveness of NP for HS-1 and the
synthetic network. In HS-1 in particular, for E[R0] of 1 or 2.5, erroneous
reporting nearly fully diluted the positive effects of NP. Yet these cir
cumstances are also those with the lowest average number of infected
individuals overall.
A variety of additional robustness checks we have performed are
detailed in the supplement. For instance, inclusion of NP(N) and NP(ε) in
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show that moderate error in nominating highly con
nected contacts will for the most part not derail the effectiveness of this
strategy. We might then ask how much error would it take. Once in
dividuals are nominating from their top 10 or more friends, we found
little difference between NP(N) and NR in all circumstances. Likewise
for random Gaussian error, once the standard deviation of this error is
greater than 30 contacts, NP(ε) is indistinguishable from NR (see
Fig. S6). We would expect these strategies to monotonically approach
NR (as distinct from R), and attribute the minor deviations from this
pattern to the stochasticity of simulations. We also varied the number of
individuals initially infected, as well as the variation in individuals’ R0,
and found no substantive differences (Figs. S4 and S5). In addition, the
number of individuals initially infected, a proxy for the extent of outside
infections introduced, does not affect the order of strategies, but shows
that the more dire the threat from outside, the more effective are these
targeted strategies relative to random vaccination, at least in the
parameter ranges we consider here (Fig. S5). In addition, we varied CV
[R0], as a proxy for wider variability in infectiousness independent of

5. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper tested the relative effectiveness of a strategy for choosing
how to allocate limited vaccines to maximise their effectiveness. That is,
to choose a random person and have them nominate from their contacts
the individual with the most contacts. This method is aimed at logistical
feasibility, allowing the administrator to survey individuals as they
receive vaccinations, needing just one survey response to administer the
first vaccine. This strategy performs significantly better than randomly
distributing vaccines, but also performs better than choosing random
contacts of individuals, a classic decentralized targeting strategy, and
often even better than simply targeting those with the highest degree,
assuming we have a full survey of the population of interest. Concretely,
the majority of reasonable parameter combinations showed better than
a 20% reduction in infections amongst the susceptible compared to
randomly vaccinating, on average across 500 simulations. One may
object that individuals’ reports of the interaction profiles of their con
tacts may prove more erroneous than self-reports. Yet, through the in
clusion of the NP(ε) and NP(N) strategies, we were able to show that
moderate error in nomination does not cripple the effectiveness of the
method.
This simulation is necessarily limited, not including all features of
realistic COVID-19 spread. Future work can explore the inclusion of
various competing strains of COVID-19, variation in the initial compo
sition of individuals in terms of having or having had COVID-19, het
erogeneity in the effectiveness of vaccination which is not total and
wanes over time, the temporality of contact networks, and many other
complexities. In addition, a separate paper could address the variation of
effectiveness under different measures, as compared to total number
infected with COVID-19 after 100 days as analysed in this paper. It is
also possible that most central individuals may not be optimal targets in
practice. The most central may differ from the general population in
various other ways, which may correlate with their unwillingness to be
vaccinated (as in the model of Wells et al., 2013), or their probability of
already being immune to the disease. We do not in this paper address the
concrete issues of implementation such as the right survey strategy to
approximate this theoretical model, and leave this to future work. Such
work could additionally investigate how the targeting strategy proposed
here could make use of the personal relationships between interviewee
and target, to mobilize interpersonal trust and communication to
convince an individual to get vaccinated, along the same lines of
respondent-driven sampling (Heckathorn, 1997).
Ethics Approval
N/A. No students were infected in this simulation study.
Data Availability Statement
In order to replicate what we present here, and to encourage
extension of our methodology and results, all code and data used in this
paper are available at https://www.github.com/amcgail/episim/.
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Undermines Superspreader Vaccination Strategies for Influenza. PLoS Comput. Biol.
9 (3), e1002945.

Alec M. McGail: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Visu
alization, Formal analysis. Scott L. Feld: Conceptualization, Supervi
sion. John A. Schneider: Conceptualization, Supervision.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.pmedr.2022.101787.
References
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